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The government of Ontario has made a number of major changes in the way that 
municipalities are governed and financed.  Some municipalities have been forced to 
amalgamate despite opposition from their residents.  Ontario has also redistributed 
the responsibilities of the province and the municipalities through the Local Service 
Realignment Program (LSR). This program is referred to as downloading. Other 
major changes include the use of market value for property tax assessment and the 
transfer of education funding to the province from the local school boards. 
This paper is concerned with two aspects of the changes. The first question 
is whether megacities are less costly to operate than many small municipalities in a 
large urban area.  The recent amalgamation of Toronto is used to examine this 
question.  Since the amalgamation occurred in 1998, the new city is still adjusting to 
the change, and only preliminary conclusions can be drawn at this time. The second 
question is concerned with the impact of downloading on the municipalities.  The 
experience of the new City of Toronto is again used to examine this question. 
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The Organization of Local Government 
 
Municipalities, their residents, the provincial governments and academics have been 
concerned with the costs and benefits of a megacity compared with many small and 
diverse municipalities within a large metropolitan area. Local governments can take 
different forms. In British Columbia and Alberta, the Municipal Acts gives residents 
the right to incorporate, dissolve and amalgamate municipal governments. 
Municipalities also have the power to produce local services themselves, to 
cooperate with other municipalities to produce services, to contract with private 
firms or to rely on volunteers and non-profit institutions for services.
2  
Large municipalities can produce some services at a lower per unit cost than 
smaller municipalities because the services are subject to economies of scale. Other 
services, such as water and sewage, require a large fixed capital input. The spreading 
of the fixed capital costs over a large output lowers the per-unit costs of production. 
Many municipal services, especially ones that are labour intensive, show increasing 
costs as output is increased. Therefore, municipalities can experience both increasing 
as well as decreasing costs with increasing size. Bish’s review of the literature 
indicates that only about 20 per cent of municipal services have lower per unit costs 
as the size of the municipality increases.
3  
                  If municipalities have the power to make their own decisions, they can 
select the size of local government that will produce municipal goods and services at 
the lowest possible cost. They can also take advantage of economies of scope 
through joint buying with other municipalities. Many municipalities within a large 
urban area also produce competition among the municipalities, and this provides a 
strong incentive to keep costs down. Since different municipalities produce different    2 
 
packages of services and taxes, Tiebout argues that residents can improve their 
economic welfare by selecting the municipality where the services and taxes best fits 
their preferences.
4  
         Obtaining information in smaller municipalities may be less costly because 
they have fewer residents for each elected official.  The elected officials know the 
area and the people well. Better information flows allow smaller municipalities to 
adjust more quickly to changing internal and external conditions. Economists favour 
this form of decentralized decision-making because it produces a more efficient 
allocation of resources within a municipality and an economy. 
        Before 2003, Ontario used centralized decision-making when it dealt with 
the municipalities.  The Province and the Provincial Ministry of Municipal Affairs 
and Housing made decisions on municipal organization and on the powers of 
municipalities within the framework of the Ontario Municipal Act.
5  
         On December 12, 2002, Royal Assent was given to a new Municipal Act, 
the Municipal Act of 2001. This Act came into force on January 1, 2003. The new 
Act gives the municipalities broad new powers to deal with local circumstances, 
without provincial government approval.  
        Municipalities are given the power of a natural person, with new power to 
tax, regulate, and to issue licenses and set fees. However, most of the regulations that 
existed in the old Act were carried forward to the new Act. 
       It is too early to determine how municipal governments will be affected by 
the new Act. While the municipal governments have more flexibility under the new 
Act, many of the centralized powers of the province are retained. 
6 
       Ontario has favoured simplifying local government by combining smaller 
units into one large unit.  The government has argued that large cities are able to 
reduce costs by eliminating duplication. Many studies have found that 
amalgamations  do not lower costs, they increase them.  Bish provides an extensive 
list of references to document this point. 
7   Sancton has made the same argument in 
a number of papers. 
8  
 
Amalgamation Savings And Costs 
 
Amalgamation Savings  
When Toronto was amalgamated in 1998, it set three-year annual targets for cost 
reductions.  One target was to cut 10 per cent of the $1.5 billion budgeted for newly 
amalgamated programs that were tax supported.
9 The city excluded expenditures for 
programs that were previously amalgamated under the Municipality of Metropolitan 
Toronto. These expenditures made up about 73 per cent of the new city’s operating 
budget.
10 The city set a second target of 10 per cent of the $173 million budgeted for 
rate supported programs, such as water and wastewater.  Therefore the total annual 
target for cost reductions was $167.3 million.    3
Table 1 
City of Toronto 
Savings and Costs from Amalgamation up to December 2000 
(Millions of Dollars) 
 
 








Total Annual Saving 
$136     from Tax Supported Amalgamated Programs 
 
  $17     from Rate Supported Programs 
 
      0     from Efficiency Savings 
 








Total Annual Costs 
 






Total Transition Costs 
$153     from Service Level Harmonization 
 
  N/A     from Wage Harmonization 
 
  $29     from Annual Financing Costs (for a ten year period) 
 
$182  
    
  $75     from Staff Exit Costs 
    $5     from Retraining Costs 
  $83     from Business Information Costs 
  $82     from Facility Consolidation and Modification Costs 
  $30     from Other Costs 
 






Source: City of Toronto, March 9, 2001, Appendix B. 
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Table 1 shows the cost savings achieved by the city up to the end of 2000, the most 
recent year when data are available. The data show that most programs met their 
targets. The city was able to achieve annual savings of $136.2 million for the 
property tax supported programs and $17.3 million for the rate supported programs 
by the end of 2000. The annual total savings achieved by 2000 were $153.5 million. 
The cumulative savings for 1998 to 2000 were $305 million.   
       Because most municipal costs are related to staffing, the bulk of the cost 
savings involved reductions in the workforce. These included eliminating vacant 
positions, retirements; voluntary exits, and targeted exits. The report notes that 
executive management positions were reduced by 60 per cent. 
11 
            In another report, the City states that between 1998 and 2002, 2,700 
positions were eliminated through amalgamation. Over the same period, the City 
added 3,600 positions to improve service levels in programs that were already 
amalgamated and to provide services in the downloaded programs.  Therefore, 
between 1998 and 2002 there was a net increase in employment of 826 positions.
12 
Amalgamation and downloading did not reduce the city’s wage bill, they increased it.  
The harmonization of wages and salaries, discussed below, further increased the 
city’s wage bill.  None of this is a surprise to scholars who study amalgamations.
13     
     The savings are gross estimates; they do not net out the new revenue from 
increased service and user fees. The savings estimates also do not take into account 
the costs of amalgamation that are discussed below. In addition they do not include 
the cost to residents from the reduced service levels compared with what they 
enjoyed before amalgamation.                      
        The important measure is the net difference between the savings and the 
increased costs from amalgamation. Since the adjustment process and downloading 
are ongoing and changing, it is difficult to determine whether the overall result will 
produce a net cost saving or a net cost increase.
14   Nevertheless, an attempt will be 
made to do this.   
      
Amalgamation Costs  
The city incurred transition costs to consolidate and integrate the various programs 
of the amalgamated municipalities. By the end of 2000, transition costs were $275 
million. Some of the costs, such as the upgrading of data services, would have been 
incurred even without amalgamation. Therefore, not all of the costs are transition 
costs.  However, as Vojnovic notes, municipal amalgamations generally result in 
transitional costs that are often higher than anticipated. 
15    
           Annual amalgamation costs include three sets of costs: the harmonization of 
services, the harmonization of wages and salaries, and the annual debt servicing 
costs. The debt serving costs will be discussed later in the paper.      
Harmonization of Services: The new city wanted to equalize the services and fees for 
waste and recycling collection, winter maintenance, public health, parks and 
recreation user fees, and boulevard and parking fees. These five services and fees   5
were identified as having the most significant differences when amalgamation took 
place. The financial constraints faced by the new city prevented these services and 
fees from being harmonized at the highest level, as is normally the case. Instead, 
service levels are being reduced in some parts of the new city and raised in other 
parts. Fees are being harmonized in the same way.   
 Harmonization of Wages and Salaries: Prior to amalgamation, Metro and each of the 
six local municipalities paid their employees different wages and salaries for the 
same jobs. The city harmonized the wages and salaries of management and its non-
union workforce first, at an estimated cost of $2 million. The issues were more 
complex for the unionized workforce because the city faced fifty-six separate 
collective agreements in the seven former municipalities. In March and April of 2000, 
the unionized inside and outside workers went on strike.
16 The contracts negotiated 
by the city reduced the number of bargaining units and collective agreements from 
fifty-six to six.
17 The negotiations also settled a large number of issues involving 
harmonization. The key demand for the harmonization of wage rates and benefits 
was not settled in the negotiations and the issues were sent to either arbitration or 
mediation.  The reduction of the differentials is inevitable even if the unions’ 
demands were not met at this stage of arbitration. The increased costs can be offset 
to some extent by a continued reduction of employment, a reduction of services and 
possibly through contracting out of some services.  Despite these measures, 
equalization will place an increasing strain on the new city’s future operating budget. 
18, 19 
 
The Financial Consequences of Downloading 
 
Social Services   
Ontario municipalities faced major financial problems because of the actions taken 
by the current provincial government.  In the election campaign of 1995, the 
Progressive Conservative Party promised to cut the provincial income tax and 
redistribute the responsibilities of the provincial and municipal governments. 
Downloading costs on the municipalities was one way that the government could 
meet its commitment to cut the income tax. However, downloading made it difficult 
for the municipalities to support their spending on social services and other programs. 
The province argued that the exchange of responsibilities was revenue neutral 
because the province took over responsibility for education. Funding for education 
came from the education property tax that was set by the province but the tax was 
collected by the municipalities. Funding also came from the province’s own general 
revenues. However, the LSR program was not revenue neutral for the new city.  The 
data provided below is intended to support this argument. 
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The Consequences of Downloading 
The redistribution of responsibilities for social and other programs between the 
province and the municipalities are summarized in Appendix Table 1. Under the 
reforms, the province continued to set program standards, but the municipalities 
became responsible for running many programs and for paying a larger share of the 
costs from the property tax and user fees. The social service programs involve a 
redistribution of income from taxpayers as a whole to low-income households.  In 
the public finance literature, local government is not usually viewed as the most 
effective level of government to operate such programs because mobility would 
offset attempts to redistribute income.
20 The availability of social service programs 
would attract migrants to the municipality and increase the demand for social 
services. Property taxpayers could avoid paying for the programs by moving outside 
of a municipality’s boundaries. 
The net effect would be to reduce tax revenue and increase the demand for 
social services. Income redistribution programs are more effective at higher levels of 
government, such as the provincial and federal governments, where mobility is less 
important. A related argument involves the type of tax used to pay for income 
redistribution programs.   
Before the reforms, the provincial government paid part of the social 
services costs, through intergovernmental transfers from the province to the 
municipalities. The municipalities also paid part of the cost from property tax and 
user fees.  After the reforms, most of the revenue came from the municipal property 
tax and user fees.  The conventional view in public finance is that broadly based 
taxes, such as the provincial income tax, are a more effective way of raising funds 
for redistribution programs than the local property tax. 
21 
 
The Financial Consequences for the City of Toronto  
The provincial government began to download costs in July 1995, although the full 
impact was not felt until 1998. 
22  The problems faced by the city are illustrated in 
Table 2. The data in the Table show the city’s annual net budget expenditures for 
selected social service programs. Included are the approved but not the actual 
expenditures for 2003.  
   The impact of downloading is shown in columns 8 to 13. Column 8 shows 
that net expenditures on the selected social service programs more than doubled 
between 1997 (before amalgamation and downloading) and 1998. The new city 
experienced large cost increases compared with 1997 in Shelters, Housing and 
Support; Public Health; and Social Assistance.  
From January 1997 to March 2000, nineteen changes were made to the 
provincial downloading program in response to municipal complaints. Some of the 
changes increased costs while others, especially after 1998, reduced them.  
The most significant change occurred in 1998, when the province 
introduced the pooling of expenditures on social welfare, social housing, and for the   7
province’s commuter transit service, Go Transit, among all of the Greater Toronto 
Area (GTA) municipalities. 
23    
              The pooling of expenditures was an attempt to internalize the negative 
externalities from social service costs for the city by pooling costs with the rest of the 
GTA. 
24 
      The GTA along with the Regional Municipality of Hamilton–Wentworth 
used to support the Go Transit commuter service.  Their contributions were based on 
pooled assessment, ridership and service levels. In September 2001, the province 
announced a multi-year program to improve and expand the province’s infrastructure.  
The Superbuild program is to provide funds to improve and expand public transit, 
the provincial road system, colleges and universities, cultural facilities and 
community centres.
25 
          Column 9 of Table 2 shows how the city began to adjust to the new 
financial environment. Between 1998 and 1999, the data show only one cost increase, 
for Children’s Services.  Decreases are shown for all the other categories. In Public 
Health, most of the reduction came from a change in provincial policy that increased 
their contributions to the program. The reduction in social assistance spending came 
about from falling unemployment rates, as the Canadian economy improved, and 
from cost cutting.  
      The city’s cost for most social services increased between 1999 and 2000.  
The increases were related to the continuing implementation of downloading and to 
the increased costs of providing the services.  Column 9 of Table 2 shows that in the 
1999 budget, significant cost cutting occurred.  As a result, budgeted expenditures on 
most social service programs decreased.  Since 1999, the cost of social services has 
been rising but not significantly. 
Table 3 shows estimates of the net downloading cost for 1997 to 1999 and 
for 2001.  The net costs consist of the increased operating cost from downloading 
less the amounts that the local Boards of Education received when the province 
assumed responsibility for education. Since the city previously financed education 
from the property tax, the provincial government’s education grants, also obtained 
from the property tax, are viewed as a reduction of the tax burden on city taxpayers. 
The net data show a significant increase of $101.9 million between 1997 and 1998.   
      Between 1998 and 1999, downloading costs fell by $61.5 million. However, 
in 2001, downloading costs increased as a result of the reduction in net operating 
costs for the reasons discussed earlier and because of a the large increase in the city’s 
payments to support the operating costs of public transit (GO) and the city owned 
Toronto Transit Commission (TTC).  The remaining costs in Table 3 show the loss 
of the capital grants for public transit. 
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Table 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
City of Toronto 
Net Expenditures on Selected Social Services, 
(millions  of  dollars)
































Children’s Services  41.3  32.5  41.5 52.8 57.3 61.2 62.4 78.7  127.7 127.2 108.5 106.8 102.0    
Long-term Care and 
Homes for the Aged  23.2  23.2  14.8 18.2 20.8 28.6 28.2 100.0  63.8 123.0 114.3 137.5 98.6    
Shelters, Housing and 
Support 14.2  273.4 271.30 252.9 270.9 268.9 274 1925.4  99.2 93.2 107.1 99.3 101.9
Library 107.8  104.5  97.90 105.1 110.3 116.8 121.8 96.9  93.7 107.4 104.9 105.9 104.3
Public Health  47.1  83.5  49.6 56.5 60.2 65.2 69.6 177.3  59.4 113.9 106.5 108.3 106.7    
























































Net Expenditures are the amounts that are funded by the property tax. They are net of all other sources 
n u e .                
         
o f   r e v e
The approved budget is the budget approved by City Council for January 1  to  December  31,  2000,
            net  of  all  other  sources  of  revenue.
u r c e :     S o
City of Toronto, “1998 Operating Program, as recommended by the Budget Committee on April 20, 1998.”           
City of Toronto, “1999 Operating Budget as recommended by the Budget Committee, April 12, 1999.”           
City of Toronto, "2000 Operating Budget as recommended by the Budget Committee,                
City of Toronto, web site, "Backgrounder, Where the money Goes …and Comes From", Data for 2002 and 2003.           9
       In 1998, 1999 and 2000, the city did not increase the tax rate on residential 
property. It has been sheltering residential taxpayers from the increased downloading 
costs with grants from the province and through increased borrowing.  In 1998, the 
province gave the city a $50 million grant to help finance its increased expenditures.   
The city also obtained $100 million dollar loans from the province in 1999 and in 
2000.  The repayment of the $200 million debt started in 2001 and was funded by 
selling debentures to the capital market. 
     Of greater significance is the city’s borrowing to finance the capital cost of 
the TTC.  Under provincial law, municipalities can borrow to finance capital but not 
operating costs.  Downloading has shifted the capital cost of public transit to the 
municipalities.  In 2001, the TTC’s capital costs were estimated at $247 million and 
they were to be financed by borrowing.  The debt service costs are estimated at $40 
million per year.  Clearly, debt servicing is going to place a significant strain on the 
city’s future operating cost budget. 
26  
 
The Implications of Downloading for the Future 
 
The city’s financial problems are directly related to amalgamation and downloading.  
The fact that the city’s operating budget has exceeded the revenue from the property 
tax and from user fees in the budgets of 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and the 
proposed budget for 2003 is strong evidence that the city is not financially self-
sufficient.  The Ontario Municipal Act does not allow municipalities to borrow on 
the capital market to finance operating budget deficits.  The only options are to 
borrow from the province, raise property taxes, raise user fees, contract out or cut 
back on service levels.  
        In the proposed budget of 2003, the City decided to keep services at the 
2002 level by using the actual expenditures in 2002 as its proposed budget for 
2003.
27 To do this; it had to raise taxes on residential property by 3 percent and to 
draw on some surplus funds.  A more obvious solution for the city’s financial 
problems is long-term provincial and federal government financial help and changes 
in the downloading program. 
       Since the city’s employment costs are rising because of wage harmonisation, 
if the city does not get long-term financial help from the provincial and the federal 
Governments, it will have to cut more services, raise taxes and privatise some of its 
functions.     
     Toronto’s problems are illustrated in Table 4. Compared with major U.S. 
cities, Toronto received no federal government transfers and a much smaller amount 
of provincial government transfers than did the 38 U.S cities.  
     Toronto’s ability to raise additional revenue is constrained by the Ontario 
Municipal Act and the unwillingness until recently, of the provincial and federal 
governments to provide additional aid.  Most of the 38 largest U.S. cities have the 
legal right to use sales taxes and a municipal income tax.  They also receive 
substantial help from the State and Federal Governments.   10 
Table 3 
The Net Downloading of Costs by the Province of Ontario 
the New City of Toronto, 1998 to 1999, and 2001 






















at Year End 
Operating Costs (1) 
 
50   693.3   601.4    594.7 
Less Education    0  -573.2  -573.2  -565.2 
Net Operating Costs    0   120.1     28.2      29.5 
Capital Costs (TTC Subsidy Loss) (2) 
 
Total                                                                                            
  0 
  
50 






  247.0 
 
  276.5 
Source:   
The 1997 data are from the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 1997 Operating Plan and Budget Toronto, February 26, 1997. 
The data in columns 2 and 3 are from the City of Toronto, “Provincial Downloading-Local Services Realignment,” 
A Report prepared for the Policy and Finance Committee by the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, December 1, 1999. 
The data for 2001 were obtained from the City of Toronto, Treasury and Financial Services Division. No data are available for 2000.  
(1). Operating costs also include subsidies for GO Transit and for the Toronto Transit Commission. (2). The capital cost of the TTC subsidy may be overstated 
for 1998 and 1999 because the province gave the city a $829 million payment for the Sheppard Subway and other TTC capital Projects. 
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Canadian municipalities have been lobbying for additional sources of funding. This 
now appears to be happening. The Province has agreed to provide the City with $64 
million for money spent by the city on safety improvements for the TTC.
28    
       In a recent article in the Toronto Star, the mayor of Toronto stated that the  
city has been promised additional funding from the federal and provincial 
governments.
29 This consists of $1.1 billion from the province for transit 
improvements and system expansion over the next decade.  The federal government 
also promised another $76 million for transit. The province and the federal 
governments have promised $90 million each for cultural projects. Another, $1.5 
billion has been promised from all three levels of government to help develop the 
waterfront.   
         An  increase  in  provincial  and federal funding is clearly important for 
Toronto. However, the funds being offered may not be enough. Without additional 
sources of tax revenue, the city will have to continue to cut services.   A column by 
Henry Aubin in the Montreal Gazette provides some evidence that this is happening.  
He quotes Michael Prue, a former Mayor of East York, who states “Grass used to be 
cut in our parks eight to ten times each summer; now it’s four to five times.”  The 
city has also closed the Marine Museum, the third most popular city-run museum.  
User fees have been raised at publicly owned recreational facilities.  Restaurants that 
use to receive free garbage pickup six nights a week now pay $1,600 a year for it.”
30
          Additional evidence on Toronto’s deteriorating financial position is 
provided by Slack. 
31  Slack quotes a report by Urban Strategies Inc estimating.    
that Toronto is investing in new infrastructure at about one-fifth the rate of 
equivalent U.S. cities. Studies done by the IBI Group, Hemson Consulting Ltd. and 
C.N. Watson & Associates show a gap of $800 million between budgeted and 
required investment for roads, bridges and urban transit in the GTA.  The reports 
conclude that the under-investment will lead to major traffic congestion, and a 
reduction in the quality of a resident’s life or welfare.
32   
  The new city still faces two significant budget problems.  The first is the 
wage and salary arbitration decisions discussed earlier. These will significantly 
increase future operating costs.  The second is the increasing debt burden from its 
decision to finance capital expenditures by borrowing from the province and the 
capital market. 
Revenue Sources Opened To The New City    
    The city is constrained in its ability to raise additional revenue.  Municipalities in 
Ontario can obtain revenue from the property tax on residential, commercial and 
industrial and other forms of real estate.  The province sets seven standard classes of 
property for tax purposes, but it can create additional classes. 
33  Municipalities can 
also obtain revenue from fees and the sale of services.  
         In 2001, the province passed Bill 140, “An Act to Amend the Assessment Act, 
Municipal Act and other Acts with respect to Property Taxes.”  This Act gives the 
province control over how the property tax can be applied to commercial property.    12 
Under the Act, the Provincial Treasurer can determine a provincial average tax ratio, 
which was set at 1.417 for 2001. The ratio is calculated by dividing the residential 
tax rate into the commercial tax rate.  Any municipality with a commercial tax rate 
greater than 1.417 cannot increase its tax revenue by imposing additional taxes on 
commercial property.  Since Toronto’s ratio in January 2001 was 4.27, only the 
residential property tax rate could be increased to raise additional revenue.
34
    The ratio for Toronto is much higher than in the rest of the GTA. For example, the 
ratios for Peel and York Regions are close to or less than 1.417.  The provincial 
government’s share of the commercial property tax rate also varies across the 
province.  The rate in Toronto is higher than in any other municipality in Ontario.  
Comparing Toronto and Mississauga, the rate in Toronto is almost twice the rate in 
Mississauga. 
Businesses in Toronto are at a cost disadvantage compared with those in the 
rest of the GTA because they pay much property higher taxes. A consultant’s report 
prepared for the City of Toronto shows that the residential property taxpayers 
received $526 million more in services than they paid in property taxes in 2000. 
The report was kept secret because it undermined the city’s argument that Bill 140 
prevented the city from increasing the commercial property tax. Some city 
councillors are now arguing that the problem is not Bill 140 but the non-competitive 
environment set by the property tax ratios, The City has to attract more commercial 
activity. In 2001, only 20% of the business building permits issued in the GTA were 
in the city. If the city attracted more business activity it would receive more business 
taxes to help pay for services. 
35  
      At the provincial level, the current conservative government released its 
party platform, called “The Road Ahead” in May 2003.  One key point in the 
platform is the proposed “Taxpayers Protection Act.”  The Act would prohibit the 
provincial government from raising tax rates without a majority of voters in a 
provincial referendum.  
Also, local governments would not be allowed to introduce a new tax or to 
increase an existing tax without the approval of a majority of the voters in a 
municipal referendum.
36 
The province also passed legislation that requires the Minister of Municipal 
Affairs to approve the wording of any question to be placed before the voters in a 
referendum.  This legislation has not yet been enacted.  If it becomes law, the Act 
would remove a municipality’s authority over its own affairs.  The legislation also 
requires that 50% of municipal voters approve the referendum. 
In Ontario only a small proportion of eligible voters actually vote in 
Municipal elections.  Getting 50% of eligible voters to approve a referendum would 
be a very difficult task.  The Association of Municipalities of Ontario has strongly 
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Demergers in Quebec 
 
The previous government of the Province of Quebec merged the adjacent local 
municipalities of Montreal, Quebec City and Longueuil into three large cities on 
January 1, 2002. This was done despite the objections of the residents of these new 
cities in local referendums. Peter Trent, the former mayor of Westmount, led the 
fight against the merger of the Montreal area municipalities. Trent did not run in the 
first Montreal megacity elections.  He led a court battle against the legislation, but he 
lost. 
38  
                Mr. Trent along with 9 other citizens of the merged cities hired a former 
Supreme Court Justice of Quebec to look at whether demergers were possible. 
Lawrence Poitras and others prepared the report, which showed the negative impacts 
of amalgamations. In every merged municipality, costs had risen. The report argued 
that demegers could be achieved for about $2 per person and they would have 
positive economic consequences. 
39 The media and most municipal politicians did 
not support the report.  However, in a recent provincial election, the leader of the 
Liberal party, Jean Charest, supported the idea. He stated that within twelve months 
of being elected his government would pass legislation permitting municipal 
referendums to allow de-mergers. If 10 percent of the population in a merged 
municipality signed a petition against amalgamation, the Provincial Government 
would allow a referendum on de-mergers.  Charest won the election. He proposed 
that legislation allowing de-merger referendums would be introduced in June 2003.  
Judge Poitras report made a number of major points against amalgamations.  
 
1.  “ All economic studies- even the former government’s own Bedard report- show 
that the bigger the city, the more it costs per capita: therefore there are 
diseconomies of scale in creating megacities” 
2.  After one year of existence, the budgets of the megacities have increased. 
Montreal’s budget went up by 1.8%, Quebec City’s budget was up by 3.5% and 
Longueuil’s budget went up by 5.5%. 
3.  The Poitras Report estimated the savings in demergers by showing that costs 
tend to drift up to highest common denominator in the merger. This point has 
already been made in the discussion about the Toronto amalgamation. 
4.  The study estimated the cost of the Montreal merge would be $200 million per 
year. Therefore the savings from demergers would also be $200 million or $111 
per capita per year for Montreal.
40  
A demerger will require a referendum and it is unlikely that the referendum would 
take place before the fall of 2004. Peter Trent, the former Mayor of Westmount has 
begun to campaign to obtain a referendum for Montreal.
41 
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Table 4 
Revenue Sources as a percent of Total Revenue, City of Toronto and 




Type of Revenue Source   
City of Toronto 
 
Total of 38 Largest          
















































Source: City of Toronto, Building the New City, Final Three Year Status Report on 
Amalgamation, January 1998 –December 2000, Office of the Chief Administrative 
Officer, May 2001, p.33, and City of Toronto, Backgrounder, City of Toronto Web 
Site. March 3, 2003. 
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Given what is happening in Quebec, the question arises as to whether 
similar legislation would be useful for Ontario?  In the City of Toronto, 
amalgamation took place in 1998. The city has already integrated the various 
municipal function that had not been merged before under the previous two-tier 
Metro form of Government. Returning to the Metro form of government would be 
both costly and difficult. Therefore, Toronto’s task is to make the merged 
government work better.  
 
Globalization and Urban Government Restructuring 
 
Globalization, the increasing integration of the world economy, has led the upper-tier 
levels of government in a number of countries to push for municipal amalgamation. 
This is based on the view that global competition requires large municipalities to 
make the urban area competitive with other world cities.    
Empircal evidence indicates that this view is not correct. Most U.S. urban 
areas consist of many municipalities. This does not make these areas uncompetitive 
with other world urban areas. Many European cities are also not centralized.   
    A recent article by Andrew Sancton
42  argues that the important element in a 
city region’s competitiveness is not its governmental structure, but its access to 
customers and suppliers, its location, the political stability of the region, the skills of 
the labour force, municipal, provincial and federal taxation, and the availability of 
cultural and other activities.  Another important element in attracting new firms is 
the incentives offered for firms to locate in the city region.  None of these elements 





Mergers that are imposed on communities despite the opposition of the residents are 
in conflict with basic democratic principles. The mergers are based on the view that 
the senior levels of government and its civil servants know what is best for the 
residents of the amalgamated communities.  
The principal human rights organization in Europe, the Council of Europe, 
is opposed to forced amalgamations. The Council’s view is incorporated in the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government. The document states that “Changes in 
local-authority boundaries shall not be made without prior consultation of the local 
communities concerned, possibly by means of a referendum where this is permitted 
by law.”
43 
      In Canada, the Canadian Federation of Municipalities has also approved a 
resolution to “support the rights of citizens to decide the form and structure of their 
own municipal government.” 
44    16 
      Bish  expresses  similar  views when he states that, “the 21
st century will 
require institutional adaptability to rapid change.  Yet in that critical area of the 
relationship among citizens, the civil community and local governance, some 
provincial governments are imposing an intellectual fashion of the nineteenth 
century in the form of an almost religious faith in monolithic government 
organisations and central control.” 
45      
     Municipalities have two major roles. They serve as agencies for the delivery 
of local services. They also serve as access points for citizens to voice their opinions 
on the nature of local governments. In amalgamated cities, the access function 
becomes more difficult for the city’s residents. This dissatisfaction has lead to 
secessionist movements because residents feel isolated from their political 
representatives. They cannot complain about local issues to the Mayor as they can in 
a small town. 
              In my interviews with Toronto councillors, I was told they have staff 
members who are dedicated to looking after citizens’ complaints and to helping 
resolve problems with the city administration.  The Toronto merger also created the 
Community Councils, which are an attempt to allow Councillors to look after local 
issues in each of the former merged municipalities.  How well they work is not clear 
at this time.   
          One of the justifications given by the provincial government to support 
amalgamation was that it would reduce costs by eliminating duplication and 
simplifying municipal government.  The evidence indicates that amalgamation has 
not reduced costs. On the contrary, it has increased costs.  Whether the city is able 
cut costs in the future without reducing service levels is not clear at this stage. Most 
studies on amalgamation, however, show that a reduction in costs is not likely. 
46   
      One positive aspect of amalgamation is that it has allowed some 
municipalities in the former Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, and especially 
the City of York, to provide a higher service level for its residents than it could with 
its own revenue.  This is related to the harmonizing service levels. Service levels 
have risen for some municipalities and fallen for others; therefore, some residents are 
better off while others are worse off.  The negative aspect of service harmonization is 
that some communities are being forced to pay for services they do not want.  They 
are also denied services that they do want and would be willing to pay for if they 
controlled their own budgets.  Since there is no reason for all services and tax rates to 
be harmonized, this problem could be easily remedied.
47
Looking back over the reports on governance in the GTA, it is evident that 
the major concern was the co-ordination of service delivery across the region. The 
creation of the new City of Toronto has not addressed this fundamental regional 
problem.  The only provincial government agency currently involved co-ordinating 
transportation services in the GTA is Go Transit.  This agency is viewed by many 
experts on transportation in the GTA as the key building block for the GTA’s 
transportation future.
48 
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Combining amalgamation and downloading has produced an untenable 
financial situation for the new city. The city is not financially self-sufficient.  
Toronto is faced with the operating and capital costs of downloading imposed by the 
province, putting a significant burden on the property tax.  The province currently 
restricts the city to the property tax and to user fees for additional revenue.  Other 
revenue sources are needed to help the city meet its financial requirements.  The lack 
of funds, other than borrowing, to maintain and add to its infrastructure, means that 
the city’s infrastructure is deteriorating and that borrowing costs will place an 
additional future burden on the city’s operating costs.  The inability to maintain and 
add to the city’s and the GTA’s infrastructure will increase urban sprawl which 
places additional costs on the city’s and on the GTA’s businesses and 
residents. 
Toronto is one of the main engines of growth for both Ontario and the rest 
of Canada.  If the provincial and federal Governments continue to deny additional 
funds to Toronto and to restrict the tax sources open to the city, the cost of living and 
of doing business in Toronto will increase. Toronto’s ability to provide the services 
required to attract and retain businesses and residents will decline.  This will 
seriously handicap Toronto’s and the GTA’s growth generating capacity and reduce 
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Appendix Table 1 
Changes in Responsibilities of the Provincial and Municipal Governments 
As a result of the Local Realignment of Services (LRS) Program 
 
Service 
Before LRS After LRS







Most social and community services were either funded by the 
province or cost shared with the municipalities under the General 
Welfare Assistance Act, the Family Benefits Act, and the 
Vocational Rehabilitation Act. These programs were replaced by 
the Social Assistance Reform Act (1997).  Under the new Act, the 
provincial government created the Ontario Works Act (1997), and 
the Ontario Disability Support Act (1997).  These Acts significantly 
changed the social assistance programs.    
The Ontario Works Act insures that financial and employment 
assistance is available for people in need. However, it also 
encourages such people to become self-sufficient.  (Section 4-1) 
 
 
To be eligible for the Ontario Works 
Program, a recipient must take training to 
help them become employable.    
 
Drug Benefits for people on this Program. 
100% provincial   Municipalities fund and deliver the program.  Assistance, 80% 
provincial/ 20% municipal Implementation, 80% provincial/ 20% 
municipal Administration, 50% provincial /50% municipal 
80% provincial/20% municipal (Section 4.2) 
Sole Parent Support (now part of Ontario 
Works Program).  
100% provincial  Benefits, 80% provincial /20% municipal Administration, 50% 
provincipal/50% municipal (Section 4.2)  
Ontario Disability Support Program.  Allowances and Benefits, 100% provincial Administration, 100% 
provincial Services, 100% provincial  
 
Child Care   100% provincial  Program Costs, 80% provincial/20% municipal administration, 
50% provincial/50% municipal  (Section 4.3) 
Long-term Care  100% provincial  50% provincial/50% municipal 
(Province of Ontario “Who Does What Reforms”, 1997) 
Hostels  80% provincial /20% municipal  Transferred to the municipalities. 
(Province of Ontario “Who Does What Reforms”, 1997). In June 
1998, the province announced that hostels would be cost shared 
on an 80% provincial /20% municipal bases retroactive to 
January 1, 1998. (Section 4.6) 
Homes for Special Care  100% provincial  50% provincial/ 50% municipal (Province of Ontario “Who Does 
What Reforms”, 1997)   22 
Public Health 
The new program is based on the Health 
Protection and Promotion Act (1997) as 
amended by the Services Improvement 
Act (1997).   
The province sets the standards, but the municipalities or local 
Boards of Health delivered the services. Funding was 100% 
provincial. 
The province sets the standards. The municipalities or local 
Boards of Health deliver the services.  After 1998, the programs 
were funded 100% by the municipalities, except for certain 
designated services, such as vaccines, which are funded 100% by 
the province. On March 23, 1999, the province agreed to pay 
50% of the costs, except for the designated programs, which are 
100% funded by the province.  The administration and the cost of 
the administration of the program were transferred to the 
municipalities.  (Section 4.4) 
 
Land Ambulance Services  
The changes are based on the Ambulance 
Act as amended by the Services 
Improvement Act (1997), and the Tax 
Credit and Revenue Protection Act (1998) 
100% provincial  The cost of operation, equipment and administration was 
transferred to the municipalities after January 1, 1998.  The 
transfer was to be completed by January 1, 2001.  On March 23, 
1999, the province changed the program and agreed to 50%/50% 
cost sharing with the municipalities. (Section 4.5) 
Social Housing 
The changes are set out in Schedule F of 
The Services Improvement Act (1997). 
This involves the transfer of costs to the 
municipalities, the reform and 
simplification of administration, and the 
transfer of responsibility for social 
housing to Consolidated Municipal 
Service Managers. Changes were also 
made to the Social Housing Act (1997). 
The federal, provincial and municipal governments own social 
housing. Some privately owned housing also received subsidies 
from the Federal and provincial governments. The Federal and 
provincial governments paid the costs of social housing.   
The first stage of social housing devolution started on January 1, 
1998, when the province began to charge the municipalities for 
the cost of social housing. After a Federal-Provincial Agreement 
was negotiated, the province would begin to simplify program 
administration based on the recommendations of advisory 
groups. The Report of the Social Housing Committee was 
released in August 1998. The third and final stage was to transfer 
most of the responsibility for administration and for provincial 
cost to the municipalities.  Some exceptions included dedicated 
supportive housing for people who need support services to live 
independently.  Provincial costs and administrative responsibility 
were transferred to the municipalities. In the GTA, the Local 
Services Alignment Program (see below) mandated cost sharing 
of social housing in the GTA among the five local governments 
of Toronto, Peel, York, Durham and Halton.  (Section 4.6) 
Women’s Shelter’s   80% provincial /20% municipal 
 
100% provincial. (Province of Ontario “Who Does What 
Reforms”, 1997). 
 






Cost shared. For the Toronto Transit Commission, the Province 
paid 75% of the Capital Costs and 50% of the operating cost deficit.   
 
100% municipal, Provincial Subsidies ended on January 1, 1998.  






Responsibility for funding and operation was transferred to the 
GTSB on January 1, 1998.   
The capital and operating costs are paid from Go Transit revenue 
and from funding obtained from the five GTA municipalities and 
the Regional Municipality of Hamilton –Wentworth and the 
Province of Ontario. (Section 5.2)  
 
Ferries  Provincial with some shared costs.   Ferries serving local needs were transferred to the municipalities. 
Other ferries, such as the Glenora and Abitibi Ferries are 
provincially funded. (Province of Ontario “Who Does What 
Reforms”, 1997)  
 
Municipal Airports  100% provincial  Responsibility for the operating and capital costs was transferred 
to the municipalities on January 1, 1999. (P. 5.6 and 5.7)  
 
Roads and Bridges 
This program is based on the Public 




Cost shared by the province and the municipalities.  The municipalities were made responsible for all roads and 
bridges that serve local needs, except in sparsely populated areas.  
On January 1, 1998, the municipalities were responsible for 
3,400 km of highways. Another 1,775 km. of provincial highway 
were transferred to the municipalities in 1997. The province 
provided the municipalities with a one-time grant of $275 million 
for capital and maintenance needs. (Section 5.4 and 5.5) 
Water and Sewage Facilities operated 
under the Ontario Clean Water Agency. 
The Water and Sewage Improvement Act 
(1997). 
 
25% Provincial/75% municipal  All provincially owned water and sewage facilities have been 
transferred to the municipalities. The transfer began in late 1997 
and it was being phased in over a two-year period. Municipalities 
selling water and sewage works to the private sector will be 
required to repay all provincial construction grants paid for the 
works since 1978. (Section 5.7) 
Septic Systems 
(Services Improvement Act, 1997) 
Approval and inspection, was 100% provincial. This is still true for 
larger or communal sewage systems. 
As of April 6, 1998, regulatory authority for approval and 
inspection of smaller-on-lot sewage systems was transferred to 
local governments.  User fees cover the cost. (Section 5-6). 
Policing (Ontario Provincial Police) 
 
This was a provincial responsibility. The Police Services Act is 
under the jurisdiction of the Solicitor General.  Amendments to the 
Act were made in November 1997. (Section 3.1)  The Act sets out 
the requirements that a municipality must meet for policing 
services. Before 1997, the province paid the cost of Ontario 
Provincial Police services for many municipalities.  (Section 3.2) 
Under the amended Act, the municipalities now pay for all OPP 
policing. In municipalities that have their own police force, the 
municipality pays the cost of policing.  (Section 3.1)   24 
Property Tax Assessment  Provincial, under the Provincial Assessment Commissioner. The 
province is still responsible for setting standards and polices for the 
new assessment system.  
 
The province set up the Ontario Property Assessment 
Corporation (OPAC) on December 31, 1998. OPAC assesses 
property based on its market value assessment. Municipalities 
now deliver and fund assessment services. (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) 
When market value assessment was introduced, the assessments 
were based on 1996 values. These were updated using 1999 
values for 2001 to 2003 taxes. The next assessments are to be 
done annually and the assessed values are to be based on 3 year 
moving averages.  (Section 2.11) 
 
Libraries  The municipalities and the province shared the cost of this service.  The municipalities are responsibly for local library services. The 
province continues to support the system through funding of the 
province wide network of shared resources, and the 
telecommunication links to connect the libraries to the global 
information network. (Province of Ontario “Who Does What 
Reforms”, 1997) 
 
Provincial Offences Act  100% provincial   Administration, prosecution, and court support for some offences 
now municipal. The municipalities now also received the revenue 
from any fines paid. (Section 7.1) 
 
 
Education  Local School Boards set the tax rates on all classes of municipal 
property and the municipalities collected and remitted the revenue 
to the Public, Catholic and French language school boards. The 
curriculum was a joint provincial and school board responsibility.  
Under the Education Quality Improvement Act, 1997 (Bill 160), 
the province sets the education property tax rates for all classes of 
property. The taxes are collected by the municipalities and given 
to the School boards based on their enrolments. The funds 
collected from the tax on business are shared among all the 
municipalities. The province also provides grants to School 
Boards from general revenues based on student needs. The tax 
rates set on residential property have been reduced from 46% in 
1998 to 41.14% in 1999. They are to be reduced by a further 10% 
over the next ten years. This is done to give the municipalities 
more revenue from the residential tax rates to help pay for their 
increased responsibilities. (Section 2.3) 
 
Source: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “Local Service Realignment, a user’s guide”, Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1999. The section numbers in the Table refer to the 
sections in the Guide where the information was obtained.  Some information was also obtained from the Province of Ontario “Who Does What Reforms”, Toronto, 1997. 
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